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I would like to open this lecture by drawing attention to a question which is 
beginning to be widely discussed: should we speak of a crisis of medicine or a 
crisis of antimedicine? In this context I shall refer to Ivan Illich’s book Medical 
Nemesis: the Expropriation of Health,2 which, given the major impact it has had 
and will continue to have in the coming months, focuses world public opinion 
on the problem of the current functioning of the institutions of medical 
knowledge and power.  
 But to analyze this phenomenon, I shall begin from at an earlier period, 
the years between 1940 and 1945, or more exactly the year 1942, when the 
famous Beveridge Plan was elaborated. This plan served as a model for the 
organization of health after the Second World War in England and in many 
other countries. The date of this Plan has a symbolic value. In 1942 – at the 
height of the World War in which 40,000,000 people lost their lives – it was 
not the right to life that was adopted as a principle, but a different and more 
                                                 
1  [Ed.] Clare O’Farrell made very extensive changes working from the French version 
while preserving some of the variations that exist in the Spanish version. Editorial 
changes were also made by Stuart Elden and Morris Rabinowitz. 
2  [Ed.] Ivan Illich, Medical Nemesis: the Expropriation of Health, London, Calder and 
Boyars, 1975. 
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substantial and complex right: the right to health. At a time when the War 
was causing large-scale destruction, society assumed the explicit task of 
ensuring its members not only life, but also a healthy life. 
  Apart from its symbolic value, this date is very important for several 
reasons: 
1. The Beveridge Plan signals that the State was taking charge of health. It 
might be argued that this was not new, since from the eighteenth century 
onwards it has been one of the functions of the State, not a fundamental one 
but still one of vital importance, to guarantee the physical health of its 
citizens. Nonetheless, until middle of the twentieth century, for the State 
guaranteeing health meant essentially the preservation of national physical 
strength, the work force and its capacity of production, and military force. 
Until then, the goals of State medicine had been, principally, if not racial, then 
at least nationalist. With the Beveridge plan, health was transformed into an 
object of State concern, not for the benefit of the State, but for the benefit of 
individuals. Man’s right to maintain his body in good health became an object 
of State action. As a consequence, the terms of the problem were reversed: the 
concept of the healthy individual in the service of the State was replaced by 
that of the State in the service of the healthy individual.   
2. It is not only a question of a reversal of rights, but also of what might be 
called a morality of the body. In the nineteenth century an abundant literature 
on health, on the obligation of individuals to secure their health and that of 
their family, etc. made its appearance in every country in the world. The 
concept of cleanliness, of hygiene, occupied a central place in all these moral 
exhortations concerning health. Numerous publications insisted on 
cleanliness as an indispensable prerequisite for good health. Health would 
allow people to work so that children could survive and ensure social labour 
and production in their turn. Cleanliness ensured good health for the 
individual and those surrounding him. In the second half of the twentieth 
century another concept arose. It was no longer a question of an obligation to 
practise cleanliness and hygiene in order to enjoy good health, but of the right 
to be sick as one wishes and as is necessary. The right to stop work began to 
take shape and became more important than the former obligation to practise 
cleanliness that had characterized the moral relation of individuals with their 
bodies. 
3. With the Beveridge Plan health entered the field of macroeconomics. The 
costs involved in health, from the loss of work days, to the necessity of 
covering those risks stopped being phenomena that could be resolved 
through the use of pension funds or with mostly private insurance. From then 
on, health – or the absence of health – the totality of conditions which allowed 
the health of individuals to be insured, became an expense, which due to its 
size became one of the major items of the State budget, regardless of what 
system of financing was used. Health began to enter the calculations of the 
macro-economy. Through the avenue of health, illnesses and the need to 
ensure the necessities of health led to a certain economic redistribution. From 
the beginning of the present century one of the functions of budgetary policy 
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in the many countries has been ensuring a certain equalization of income, if 
not of property, through the tax system. This redistribution did not, however, 
depend on taxes, but on the system of regulation and economic coverage of 
health and illnesses. In ensuring for all the same opportunities for receiving 
treatment, there was an attempt to correct inequalities in income. Health, 
illness, and the body began to have their social locations and, at the same 
time, were converted into a means of individual socialization.  
4. Health became the object of an intense political struggle. At the end of the 
Second World War and with the triumphant election of the Labour party in 
England in 1945, there was no political party or political campaign, in any 
developed country, that did not address the problem of health and the way in 
which the State would ensure and finance this type of expenditure. The 
British elections of 1945, as well as those relating to the pension plans in 
France in 1947, which saw the victory of the representatives of the 
Confédération générale du travail [General Confederation of Workers], mark the 
importance of the political struggle over health. 
 Taking the Beveridge Plan as a point of symbolic reference, one can 
observe over the ten years from 1940-1950 the formulation of a new series of 
rights, a new morality, a new economics, a new politics of the body. 
Historians have accustomed us to drawing a careful and meticulous relation 
between what people say and what they think, the historical development of 
their representations and theories and the history of the human spirit. 
Nevertheless, it is curious to note that they have always ignored that 
fundamental chapter that is the history of the human body. In my opinion, the 
years 1940-1950 should be chosen as dates of reference marking the birth of 
this new system of rights, this new morality, this new politics and this new 
economy of the body in the modern Western world. Since then, the body of 
the individual has become one of the chief objectives of State intervention, one 
of the major objects of which the State must take charge.  
 In a humorous vein, we might make an historical comparison. When 
the Roman Empire was crystallized in Constantine’s era, the State, for the first 
time in the history of the Mediterranean world, took on the task of caring for 
souls. The Christian State not only had to fulfil the traditional functions of the 
Empire, but also had to allow souls to attain salvation, even if it had to force 
them to. Thus, the soul became one of the objects of State intervention. All the 
great theocracies, from Constantine to the mixed theocracies of eighteenth 
century Europe, were political regimes in which the salvation of the soul was 
one of the principal objectives. 
 One could say that the present situation has actually been developing 
since the eighteenth century not a theocracy, but a ‘somatocracy’. We live in a 
regime that sees the care of the body, corporal health, the relation between 
illness and health, etc. as appropriate areas of State intervention. It is precisely 
the birth of this somatocracy, in crisis since its origins, that I am proposing to 
analyze. 
 At the moment medicine assumed its modern functions, by means of a 
characteristic process of nationalization, medical technology was experiencing 
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one of its rare but extremely significant advances. The discovery of antibiotics 
and with them the possibility of effectively fighting for the first time against 
infectious diseases, was in fact contemporary with the birth of the major 
systems of social security. It was a dazzling technological advance, at the very 
moment a great political, economic, social, and legal mutation of medicine 
was taking place. 
 The crisis became apparent from this moment on, with the 
simultaneous manifestation of two phenomena: on the one hand, 
technological progress signalling an essential advance in the fight against 
disease; on the other hand, the new economic and political functioning of 
medicine. These two phenomena did not lead to the improvement of health 
that had been hoped for, but rather to a curious stagnation in the benefits that 
could have arisen from medicine and public health. This is one of the earlier 
aspects of the crisis I am trying to analyze. I will be referring to some of its 
effects to show that that the recent development of medicine, including its 
nationalization and socialization – of which the Beveridge Plan gives a 
general vision – is of earlier origin. 
 Actually, one must not think that medicine up until now has remained 
an individual or contractual type of activity that takes place between patient 
and doctor, and which has only recently taken social tasks on board. On the 
contrary, I shall try to demonstrate that medicine has been a social activity 
since the eighteenth century. In a certain sense, ‘social medicine’ does not 
exist because all medicine is already social. Medicine has always been a social 
practice. What does not exist is non-social medicine, clinical individualizing 
medicine, medicine of the singular relation. All this is a myth that defended 
and justified a certain form of social practice of medicine: private professional 
practice. Thus, if in reality medicine is social, at least since its great rise in the 
eighteenth century, the present crisis is not really new, and its historical roots 
must be sought in the social practice of medicine. 
 As a consequence, I shall not be posing the problem in the terms used 
by Illich and his disciples: medicine or antimedicine, should we save medicine 
or not? The problem is not whether to have individual or social medicine, but 
whether to question the model of the development of medicine beginning in 
the eighteenth century, that is, from when what we might describe as the ‘take 
off’ of medicine occurred. This ‘take off’ of health in the developed world was 
accompanied by a technical and epistemological removal of important 
obstacles in medicine and in a series of social practices. And it is precisely 
these specific forms of ‘take off’ that have produced the current crisis. The 
problem can be posed in the following terms: (1) what was that model of 
development? (2) to what extent can it be corrected? (3) to what extent can it 
be used today in societies or populations that have not experienced the 
European and American model of economic and political development? To 
sum up, what is this model of development? Can it be corrected and applied 
in other places? I would now like to expose some hidden aspects of this 
current crisis. 
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Scientificity and Efficacy of Medicine 
 
In the first place, I would like to refer to the separation or distortion that exists 
between the scientificity of medicine and the positive nature of its effects, or 
between the scientificity and the efficacy of medicine. It was not necessary to 
wait for Illich or the disciples of anti-medicine to know that one of the 
capabilities of medicine is killing. Medicine kills, it has always killed, and it 
has always been aware of this. What is important, is that until recent times the 
negative effects of medicine remained inscribed within the register of medical 
ignorance. Medicine killed through the doctor’s ignorance or because 
medicine itself was ignorant. It was not a true science, but rather a rhapsody 
of ill-founded, poorly established and unverified sets of knowledge. The 
harmfulness of medicine was judged in proportion to its non-scientificity. 
 But what emerged at the beginning of the twentieth century, was the 
fact that medicine could be dangerous, not through its ignorance and 
falseness, but through its knowledge, precisely because it was a science. Illich 
and those who are inspired by him uncovered a series of data around this 
theme, but I am not sure how well elaborated they are. One must set aside 
different spectacular results designed for the consumption of journalists. I 
shall not dwell therefore on the considerable decrease in mortality during a 
doctors strike in Israel; nor shall I mention well-recorded facts whose 
statistical elaboration does not allow the definition or discovery of what is 
being dealt with. This is the case in relation to the investigation by the 
National Institutes of Health (USA) according to which in 1970, 1,500,000 
persons were hospitalized due to the consumption of medications. These 
statistics are upsetting but do not afford convincing proof, as they do not 
indicate the manner in which these medications were administered, or who 
consumed them, etc. Neither shall I analyze the famous investigation of 
Robert Talley, who demonstrated that in 1967, 3,000 North Americans died in 
hospitals from the side effects of medications. All that taken as a whole does 
not have great significance nor is it based on a valid analysis.3 There are other 
factors that need to be known. For example, one needs to know the how these 
medications were administered, if the problems were a result of an error by 
the doctor, the hospital staff or the patient himself, etc. Nor shall I dwell on 
the statistics concerning surgical operations, particularly in relation to certain 
studies of hysterectomies in California that indicate that out of 5,500 cases, 
14% of the operations failed, 25% of the patients died young, and that in only 
40% of the cases was the operation necessary. All these facts, made notorious 
by Illich, relate to the ability or ignorance of the doctors, without casting 
doubt on medicine itself in its scientificity. 
 On the other hand what appears to me to be much more interesting 
and which poses the real problem is what one might call positive 
                                                 
3  [Ed.] Letters in relation to this study can be found in Robert B. Talley, Marc F. 
Laventurier, and C. Joseph Stetler, ‘Letters: Drug Induced Illness.’ Journal of the 
American Medical Association 229, no. 8 (1974) pp. 1043-44. 
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iatrogenicity, rather than iatrogenicity4: the harmful effects of medication due 
not to errors of diagnosis or the accidental ingestion of those substances, but 
to the action of medical practice itself, in so far as it has a rational basis. At 
present, the instruments that doctors and medicine in general have at their 
disposal cause certain effects, precisely because of their efficacy. Some of these 
effects are purely harmful and others are unable to be controlled, which leads 
the human species into a perilous area of history, into a field of probabilities 
and risks, the magnitude of which cannot be precisely measured. 
 It is known, for example, that anti-infectious treatment, the highly 
successful struggle carried out against infectious agents, led to a general 
decrease of the threshold of the organism’s sensitivity to hostile agents. This 
means that to the extent that the organism can defend itself better, it protects 
itself, naturally, but on the other hand, it is more fragile and more exposed if 
one restricts contact with the stimuli which provoke defences. 
 More generally, one can say that through the very effect of medications 
– positive and therapeutic effects – there occurs a disturbance, even 
destruction, of the ecosystem, not only at the individual level, but also at the 
level of the human species itself. Bacterial and viral protection, which 
represent both a risk and a protection for the organism, with which it has 
functioned until then, undergoes a change as a result of the therapeutic 
intervention, thus becoming exposed to attacks against which the organism 
had previously been protected. 
 Nobody knows where the genetic manipulation of the genetic potential 
of living cells in bacteria or in viruses will lead. It has become technically 
possible to develop agents that attack the human body against which there 
are no means of defence. One could forge an absolute biological weapon 
against man and the human species without the means of defence against this 
absolute weapon being developed at the same time. This has led American 
laboratories to call for the prohibition of some genetic manipulations that are 
at present technically possible. 
We thus enter a new dimension of what we might call medical risk. 
Medical risk, that is the inextricable link between the positive and negative 
effects of medicine, is not new: it dates from the moment when the positive 
effects of medicine were accompanied by various negative and harmful 
consequences. With regards to this there are numerous examples that 
signpost the history of modern medicine dating from the eighteenth century. 
In that century, for the first time, medicine acquired sufficient power to allow 
certain patients to become healthy enough to leave a hospital. Until the 
middle of the eighteenth century people generally did not survive a stay in a 
hospital. People entered this institution to die. The medical technique of the 
eighteenth century did not allow the hospitalized individual to leave the 
institution alive. The hospital was a cloister where one went to breathe one’s 
last; it was a true ‘mortuary’. 
                                                 
4  [Ed.] Caused by a doctor, from iatros, physician. 
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 Another example of a significant medical advance accompanied by a 
great increase in mortality was the discovery of anaesthetics and the 
technique of general anaesthesia in the years from 1844 to 1847. As soon as a 
person could be put to sleep surgical operations could be performed, and the 
surgeons of the time devoted themselves to this work with great enthusiasm. 
But at the time they did not have access to sterilized instruments. Sterile 
surgical technique was not introduced into medical practice until 1870. After 
the Franco-Prussian war and the relative success of German doctors, it 
became a current practice in many countries.  
 As soon as individuals could be anaesthetized, the pain barrier – the 
natural protection of the organism – disappeared and one could proceed with 
any operation whatsoever. In the absence of sterile surgical technique, there 
was no doubt that every operation was not only risky, but led to almost 
certain death. For example, during the war of 1870, a famous French surgeon, 
Guérin, performed amputations on several wounded men, but only 
succeeded in saving one; the others died. This is a typical example of the way 
medicine has always functioned, on the basis of its own failures and the risks 
it has taken. There has been no major medical advance that has not paid the 
price in various negative consequences. 
 This characteristic phenomenon of the history of modern medicine has 
acquired a new dimension today in so far as that, until the most recent 
decades, medical risk concerned only the individual under care. At most, one 
could adversely affect the individual’s direct descendants, that is, the power 
of a possible negative action limited itself to a family or its descendants. 
Nowadays, with the techniques at the disposal of medicine, the possibility for 
modifying the genetic cell structure not only affects the individual or his 
descendants but the entire human race. Every aspect of life now becomes the 
subject of medical intervention. We do no know yet whether man is capable 
of fabricating a living being which will make it possible to modify the entire 
history of life and the future of life. 
 A new dimension of medical possibilities arises that I shall call bio-
history. The doctor and the biologist are no longer working at the level of the 
individual and his descendants, but are beginning to work at the level of life 
itself and its fundamental events. This is a very important element in bio-
history. 
It has been known since Darwin that life evolved, that the evolution of 
living species is determined, to a certain degree, by accidents which might be 
of a historical nature. Darwin knew, for example, that enclosure in England, a 
purely economic and legal practice, had modified the English fauna and flora. 
The general laws of life, therefore, were then linked to that historical 
occurrence. In our days something new is in the process of being discovered; 
the history of man and life are profoundly intertwined. The history of man 
does not simply continue life, nor is simply content to reproduce it, but to a 
certain extent renews it, and can exercise a certain number of fundamental 
effects on its processes. This is one of the great risks of contemporary 
medicine and one of the reasons for the uneasiness communicated from 
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doctors to patients, from technicians to the general population, with regards 
to the effects of medical action. 
 A series of phenomena, like the radical and bucolic rejection of 
medicine in favour of a non-technical reconciliation with nature, themes of 
millenarianism and the fear of an apocalyptic end of the species, represent the 
vague echo in public awareness of this technical uneasiness that biologists 
and doctors are beginning to feel with regards to the effects of their own 
practice and their own knowledge. Not knowing stops being dangerous when 
the danger feared is knowledge itself. Knowledge is dangerous, not only 
because of its immediate consequences for individuals or groups of 
individuals, but also at the level of history itself. This is one of the 




The second characteristic is what I am going to call the phenomenon of 
undefined ‘medicalization’. It is often argued that in the twentieth century 
medicine began to function outside its traditional field as defined by the 
wishes of the patient, his pain, his symptoms, his malaise. This area defined 
medical treatment and circumscribed its field of activity, which was 
determined by a domain of objects called illnesses and which gave medical 
status to the patient’s demands. It was thus that the domain specific to 
medicine was defined. 
 There is no doubt that if this is its specific domain, contemporary 
medicine has gone considerably beyond it for several reasons. In the first 
place, medicine responds to another theme which is not defined by the wishes 
of the patient, wishes which now exist only in limited cases. More frequently, 
medicine is imposed on the individual, ill or not, as an act of authority. One 
can cite several examples in this instance. Today, nobody is employed 
without a report from a doctor who has the authority to examine the 
individual. There is a systematic and compulsory policy of ‘screening’, of 
tracking down disease in the population, a process which does not answer 
any patient demand. In some countries, a person accused of having 
committed a crime, that is, an infringement considered as sufficiently serious 
to be judged by the courts, must submit to compulsory examination by a 
psychiatric expert. In France, it is compulsory for every individual coming 
under the purview of the legal system, even if it is a correctional court. These 
are examples of a type of a familiar medical intervention that does not derive 
from the patient’s wishes. 
 In the second place, the objects that make up the area of medical 
treatment are not just restricted to diseases. I offer two examples. Since the 
beginning of the twentieth century, sexuality, sexual behaviour, sexual 
deviations or anomalies have been linked to medical treatment, without a 
doctor’s saying, unless he is naive, that a sexual anomaly is a disease. The 
systematic treatment by medical therapists of homosexuals in Eastern 
European countries is characteristic of the ‘medicalization’ of something that 
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is not a disease, either from the point of view of the person under treatment or 
the doctor. 
 More generally, it might be argued that health has been transformed 
into an object of medical treatment. Everything that ensures the health of the 
individual; whether it be the purification of water, housing conditions or 
urban life styles, is today a field for medical intervention that is no longer 
linked exclusively to diseases. Actually, the authoritarian intervention of 
medicine in an ever widening field of individual or collective existence is an 
absolutely characteristic fact. Today medicine is endowed with an 
authoritarian power with normalizing functions that go beyond the existence 
of diseases and the wishes of the patient. 
 If the jurists of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries are considered 
to have invented a social system that had to be governed by a system of 
codified laws, it might be argued that in the twentieth century doctors are in 
the process of inventing a society, not of law, but of the norm. What governs 
society are not legal codes but the perpetual distinction between normal and 
abnormal, a perpetual enterprise of restoring the system of normality. This is 
one of the characteristics of contemporary medicine, although it may easily be 
demonstrated that it is a question of an old phenomenon, linked to the 
medical ‘take off’. Since the eighteenth century, medicine has continually 
involved itself in what is not its business, that is, in matters other than 
patients and diseases. It was precisely in this manner that epistemological 
obstacles were able to be removed at the end of the eighteenth century. 
 Until sometime between 1720 to 1750, the activities of doctors focused 
on the demands of patients and their diseases. Thus has it been since the 
Middle Ages, with arguably non-existent scientific and therapeutic results. 
Eighteenth century medicine freed itself from the scientific and therapeutic 
stagnation in which it had been mired beginning in the medieval period. 
From this moment on, medicine began to consider fields other than ill people 
and became interested in aspects other than diseases, changing from being 
essentially clinical to being social. 
 The four major processes which characterize medicine in the 
eighteenth century, are as follows: 
1. Appearance of a medical authority, which is not restricted to the authority 
of knowledge, or of the erudite person who knows how to refer to the right 
authors. Medical authority is a social authority that can make decisions 
concerning a town, a district, an institution, or a regulation. It is the 
manifestation of what the Germans called Staatsmedizin, medicine of the State. 
2. Appearance of a medical field of intervention distinct from diseases: air, 
water, construction, terrains, sewerage, etc. In the eighteenth century all this 
became the object of medicine.  
3. Introduction of an site of collective medicalization: namely, the hospital. 
Before the eighteenth century, the hospital was not an institution of 
medicalization, but of aid to the poor awaiting death. 
4. Introduction of mechanisms of medical administration: recording of data, 
collection and comparison of statistics, etc. 
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 With a base in the hospital and in all these social controls, medicine 
was able to gain momentum, and clinical medicine acquired totally new 
dimensions. To the extent that medicine became a social practice instead of an 
individual one, opportunities were opened up for anatomical pathology, for 
hospital medicine and the advances symbolized by the names of Bichat, 
Laënnec, Bayle, et al. As a consequence, medicine dedicated itself to areas 
other than diseases, areas not governed by the wishes of the sick person. This 
is an old phenomenon that forms one of the fundamental characteristics of 
modern medicine. But what more particularly characterizes the present phase 
in this general tendency is that in recent decades, medicine in acting beyond 
its traditional boundaries of ill people and diseases is taking over other areas. 
If in the eighteenth century, medicine had in fact gone beyond its classic limits 
there were still things that remained outside medicine and did not seem to be 
‘medicalizable’. There were fields outside medicine and one could conceive of 
the existence of a bodily practice, a hygiene, a sexual morality etc., that was 
not controlled or codified by medicine. The French Revolution, for example, 
conceived of a series of projects concerning a morality of the body, a hygiene 
of the body, that were not in any way under the control of doctors. A kind of 
happy political order was imagined, in which the management of the human 
body, hygiene, diet and the control of sexuality corresponded to a collective 
and spontaneous consciousness. This ideal of a non-medical regulation of the 
body and of human conduct can be found throughout the nineteenth century 
in the work of Raspail for example.5 
What is diabolical about the present situation is that whenever we 
want to refer to a realm outside medicine we find that it has already been 
medicalized. And when one wishes to object to medicine’s deficiencies, its 
drawbacks and its harmful effects, this is done in the name of a more 
complete, more refined and widespread medical knowledge. 
 I should like to mention an example in this regard: Illich and his 
followers point out that therapeutic medicine, which responds to a 
symptomatology and blocks the apparent symptoms of diseases, is bad 
medicine. They propose in its stead a demedicalized art of health made up of 
hygiene, diet, lifestyle, work and housing conditions etc. But what is hygiene 
at present except a series of rules set in place and codified by biological and 
medical knowledge, when it is not medical authority itself that has elaborated 
it? Anti-medicine can only oppose medicine with facts or projects that have 
been already set up by a certain type of medicine. 
 I am going to cite another example taken from the field of psychiatry. It 
might be argued that the first form of antipsychiatry was psychoanalysis. At 
the end of the nineteenth psychoanalysis was aimed at the demedicalization 
of various phenomena that the major psychiatric symptomatology of that 
same century had classified as illnesses. This antipsychiatry is a 
psychoanalysis, not only of hysteria and neurosis, which Freud tried to take 
                                                 
5  [Ed.] François Vincent Raspail, Histoire naturelle de la santé et de la maladie, suivie du 
formulaire pour une nouvelle méthode de traitement hygiénique et curatif, Paris: A. 
Levavasseur, 2 Volumes, 1843. 
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away from psychiatrists, but also of the daily conduct which now forms the 
object of psychoanalytic activity. Even if psychoanalysis is now opposed by 
antipsychiatry and antipsychoanalysis, it is still a matter of a type of activity 
and discourse based on a medical perspective and knowledge. One cannot get 
away from medicalization, and every effort towards this end ends up 
referring to medical knowledge. 
 Finally, I would like to take an example from the field of criminality 
and criminal psychiatry. The question posed by the penal codes of the 
nineteenth century consisted in determining whether an individual was 
mentally ill or delinquent. According to the French Code of 1810, one could 
not be both delinquent and insane. If you were mad, you were not delinquent, 
and the act committed was a symptom, not a crime, and as a result you could 
not be sentenced. 
 Today an individual considered as delinquent has to submit to 
examination as though he were mad before being sentenced. In a certain way, 
at the end of the day, he is always condemned as insane. In France at least, a 
psychiatric expert is not summoned to give an opinion as to whether the 
individual was responsible for the crime. The examination is limited to 
finding out whether the individual is dangerous or not. 
 What does this concept of dangerous mean? One of two things: either 
the psychiatrist responds that the person under treatment is not dangerous, 
that is, that he is not ill and is not manifesting any pathology, and that since 
he is not dangerous there is no reason to sentence him. (His non-
pathologization allows sentence not to be passed). Or else the doctor says that 
the subject is dangerous because he had a frustrated childhood, because his 
superego is weak, because he has no notion of reality, that he has a paranoid 
constitution, etc. In this case the individual has been ‘pathologized’ and may 
be imprisoned, but he will be imprisoned because he has been identified as ill. 
So then, the old dichotomy in the Civil Code, which defined the subject as 
being either delinquent or mad, is eliminated. As a result there remain two 
possibilities, being slightly sick and really delinquent, or being somewhat 
delinquent but really sick. The delinquent is unable to escape his pathology. 
Recently in France, an ex-inmate wrote a book to make people understand 
that he stole not because his mother weaned him too soon or because his 
superego was weak or that he suffered from paranoia, but because he was 
born to steal and be a thief.6 
Pathology has become a general form of social regulation. There is no 
longer anything outside medicine. Fichte spoke of the ‘closed commercial 
State’ to describe the situation of Prussia in 1810.7 One might argue in relation 
                                                 
6  [Ed.] Foucault is probably referring to Serge Livrozet, De la prison à la révolte. Paris: 
Mercure de France, 1973. Foucault’s preface to this book also appears in Dits et écrits. 
Paris: Gallimard, 1994, vol II, pp. 394-416. 
7  [Ed.] Johann Gottlieb Fichte, Der geschlossne Handelsstaat, Tübingen: Coota, 1800. 
There is no complete translation into English, but for selections, see Hans Reiss (ed.), 
The Political Thought of the German Romantics, 1793-1815, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1955, 
pp. 86-102. 
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to modern society that we live in the ‘open medical States’ in which 
medicalization is without limits. Certain popular resistances to medicalization 
are due precisely to this perpetual and constant predomination. 
 
The Political Economy of Medicine  
 
Finally I should like to speak of another characteristic of modern medicine, 
namely, what might be called the political economy of medicine. Here again, 
it is not a question of a recent phenomenon, since beginning in the eighteenth 
century medicine and health have been presented as an economic problem. 
Medicine developed at the end of the eighteenth century in response to 
economic conditions. One must not forget that the first major epidemic 
studied in France in the eighteenth century and which led to a national data 
gathering was not really an epidemic but an epizootic. It was the catastrophic 
loss of life of herds of cattle in the south of France that contributed to the 
origin of the Royal Society of Medicine. The Academy of Medicine in France 
was born from an epizootic, not from an epidemic, which demonstrates that 
economic problems were what motivated the beginning of the organization of 
this medicine.  
 It might also be argued that the great neurology of Duchenne de 
Boulogne, Charcot, et al., was born in the wake of the railroad accidents and 
work accidents that occurred around 1860, at the same time that the problems 
of insurance, work incapacity and the civil responsibility of employers and 
transporters, etc. were being posed. The economic question is certainly 
present in the history of medicine.  
But what turns out to be peculiar to the present situation is that medicine is 
linked to major economic problems in a different way from the traditional 
links. Previously, medicine was expected to provide society with strong 
individuals who were capable of working, of ensuring the constancy, 
improvement and reproduction of the work force. Medicine was called on as 
an instrument for the maintenance and reproduction of the work force 
essential to the functioning of modern society. 
 At present, medicine connects with the economy by another route. Not 
simply in so far as it is capable of reproducing the work force, but also in that 
it can directly produce wealth in that health is a need for some and a luxury 
for others. Health becomes a consumer object, which can be produced by 
pharmaceutical laboratories, doctors, etc., and consumed by both potential 
and actual patients. As such, it has acquired economic and market value. 
 Thus the human body has been brought twice over into the market: 
first by people selling their capacity to work, and second, through the 
intermediary of health. Consequently, the human body once again enters an 
economic market as soon as it is susceptible to diseases and health, to well 
being or to malaise, to joy or to pain, and to the extent that it is the object of 
sensations, desires, etc. As soon as the human body enters the market, 
through health consumption, various phenomena appear which lead to 
dysfunctions in the contemporary system of health and medicine.  
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 Contrary to what one might expect, the introduction of the human 
body and of health into the system of consumption and the market did not 
correlatively and proportionally raise the standard of health. The introduction 
of health into an economic system that could be calculated and measured 
showed that the standard of health did not have the same social effects as the 
standard of living. The standard of living is defined by the consumer index. If 
the growth of consumption leads to an increase in the standard of living, in 
contrast, the growth of medical consumption does not proportionally improve 
the level of health. Health economists have made various studies 
demonstrating this. For example, Charles Levinson, in a 1964 study of the 
production of health, showed that an increase of 1% in the consumption of 
medical services led to a decrease in the level of mortality by 0.1%. This 
deviation might be considered as normal but only occurs as a purely fictitious 
model. When medical consumption is placed in a real setting, it can be 
observed that environmental variables, in particular food consumption, 
education and family income, are factors that have more influence than 
medical consumption on the rate of mortality. Thus, an increased income may 
exercise a negative effect on mortality that is twice as effective as the 
consumption of medication. That is, if incomes increase only in the same 
proportion as the consumption of medical services, the benefits of the increase 
in medical consumption will be cancelled out by the small increase in income. 
Likewise, education is two and one-half times more important for the 
standard of living than medical consumption. It follows that, in order to live 
longer, a higher level of education is preferable to the consumption of 
medicine. 
 If medical consumption is placed in the context of other variables that 
have an effect on the rate of mortality, it will be observed that this factor is the 
weakest of all. Statistics in 1970 indicate that, despite a constant increase in 
medical consumption, the rate of mortality, which is one of the most 
important indicators of health, did not decrease, and remains greater for men 
than for women. Consequently, the level of medical consumption and the 
level of health have no direct relation, which reveals the economic paradox of 
an increase in consumption that is not accompanied by any positive effect on 
health, morbidity and mortality. 
 Another paradox of the introduction of health into the political 
economy is that the social changes that were expected to occur via the systems 
of social security did not occur as expected. In reality, the inequality of 
consumption of medical services remains just as significant as before. The rich 
continue to make use of medical services more than the poor. This is the case 
today in France. The result is that the weakest consumers, who are also the 
poorest, fund the over consumption of the rich. In addition, scientific research 
and the great proportion of the most valuable and expensive hospital 
equipment are financed by social security payments, whereas the private 
sectors are the most profitable because they use relatively less complicated 
technical equipment. What in France is called the hospital hotel business, that 
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is, a brief hospitalization for minor procedures, such as a minor operation, is 
supported in this way by the collective and social financing of diseases. 
Thus, we can see that the equalization of medical consumption that 
was expected from social security was watered down in favour of a system 
that tends more and more to reinforce the major inequalities in relation to 
illness and death that characterized nineteenth century society. Today, the 
right to equal health for all is caught in a mechanism which transforms it into 
an inequality. 
 Doctors are confronted with the following problem: who profits from 
the social financing of medicine, the profits derived from health? Apparently 
doctors, but this is not in fact the case. The remuneration that doctors receive, 
however elevated it might be in certain countries, represents only a minor 
proportion of the economic benefits derived from illness and health. Those 
who make the biggest profits from health are the major pharmaceutical 
companies. In fact, the pharmaceutical industry is supported by the collective 
financing of health and illness through social security payments from funds 
paid by people required to insure their health. If health consumers - that is, 
those who are covered by social security - are not yet fully aware of this 
situation, doctors are perfectly well aware of it. These professionals are more 
and more aware that they are being turned into almost mechanized 
intermediaries between the pharmaceutical industry and client demand, that 
is, into simple distributors of medicine and medication. 
 We are living a situation in which certain phenomena have led to a 
crisis. These phenomena have not fundamentally changed since the 
eighteenth century, a period that marked the appearance of a political 
economy of health with processes of generalized medicalization and 
mechanisms of bio-history. The current so-called crisis in medicine is only a 
series of exacerbated supplementary phenomena that modify some aspects of 
the tendency, but did not create it. 
The present situation must not be considered in terms of medicine or 
antimedicine, or whether or not medicine should be paid for, or whether we 
should return to a type of natural hygiene or paramedical bucolicism. These 
alternatives do not make sense. On the other hand what does make sense - 
and it is in this context that certain historical studies may turn out to be useful 
- is to try to understand the health and medical ‘take off’ in Western societies 
since the eighteenth century. It is important to know which model was used 
and how it can be changed. Finally, societies that were not exposed to this 
model of medical development must be examined. These societies, because of 
their colonial or semi-colonial status, had only a remote or secondary relation 
to those medical structures and are now asking for medicalization. They have 
a right to do so because infectious diseases affect millions of people, and it 
would not be valid to use an argument, in the name of an antimedical 
bucolicism, that if these countries do not suffer from these infections they will 
later experience degenerative illnesses as in Europe. It must be determined 
whether the eighteenth- and nineteenth-century European model of medical 
development should be reproduced as is, or modified and to what extent it 
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can be effectively applied to these societies without the negative consequences 
we already know. 
 Therefore, I believe that an examination of the history of medicine has 
a certain utility. It is a matter of acquiring a better knowledge, not so much of 
the present crisis in medicine, which is a false concept, but of the model for 
the historical development of medicine since the eighteenth century with a 
view to seeing how it is possible to change it. 
 This is the same problem that prompted modern economists to engage 
in the study of the European economic ‘take off’ in the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries with a view to seeing how this model of development 
could be adapted to non-industrialized societies. One needs to adopt the same 
modesty and pride as the economists in order to argue that medicine should 
not be rejected or adopted as such; that medicine forms part of an historical 
system. It is not a pure science, but is part of an economic system and of a 
system of power. It is necessary to determine what the links are between 
medicine, economics, power and society in order to see to what extent the 
model might be rectified or applied. 
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